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Conventional wisdom has it that the Asian “miracle” was fueled by a strictly defined
set of “Asian values.” On closer examination, those values turn out to be more
Western than Asian. The “miracle,” moreover, often achieved economic development at
the expense of political underdevelopment and ecological destruction. The resulting
“Asian model” eschewed a wide range of nonmaterial goals, such as communal integri-
ty and environmental balance, which were deeply embedded in Asian traditions. It took
the Asian Crash to puncture that model, casting doubt on the working assumptions of
three decades of full-throttle economism. Before the Crash, democratic values were often
dismissed - along with human rights, gender rights, and environmental protection - as
luxuries to be deferred until after development was complete. Some iconoclasts, such as
Amartya Sen, strongly refuted that modernist formula, but it was the Crash that pro-
vided the smoking gun to place postmaterialism on the Asian political map. The result
is not only a more sustainable model of development, but a more inclusive view of
Asian values.
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INTRODUCTION: THE CRASH AS QUESTION MARK
This study takes the Asian Crash of 1997 as a critical window on current
globalization. So too it affords a revisionist perspective on the so-called
“Asian miracle,” whose politics have too often been conceived as an
inevitable product of endemic Asian values. Even the economic side of that
“miracle” is ripe for demythologization.
In large part the myth of the miracle was a product of Cold War exigency.
Even though the US preached the dogma of the free market, geopolitical
considerations made it turn a blind eye on the radical departure of Asian
NICs (newly industrialized countries) from free market ideology. As the
Cold War wound down, however, Washington began redefining its agenda.
Asian economies were pressed to adopt neoliberal programs of privatiza-
tion and deregulation (Bello, 2001: 13, 10). This restructuration effort
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reached its apogee during the Clinton administration, when financial inter-
ests became the dominant force behind US policy. That paved the way for a
massive influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Rim economies. Net pri-
vate capital inflows to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and the
Philippines jumped from $37.9 billion in 1994 to $79.2 billion in 1995, and
finally to $97.1 billion in 1996 (Bello, 2001: 140). It was this systemic excess,
rather than Asian “crony capitalism” or any “lack of transparency” — as the
official IMF interpretation contended (IMF, 2000) — which sparked the
Crash.
If Asian values did not “cause” the Crash, then their role in the making of
the preceding “miracle” is also called into question. From Krugman’s (1994:
70) perspective, the “miracle” can best be explained in terms of material
inputs such as surplus labor and capital. This not only punctures the
“miraculous” image of the Asian takeoff, but also its dependence on cultur-
al exceptionalism (Krugman, 1999: 33). “Asian values” turn out to be an
invented tradition that in many ways is more Western than Asian. The
“miracle,” moreover, purchased economic growth in the hard currency of
political underdevelopment and ecological holocaust.
As Amartya Sen points out, however, the Asian model did offer a degree
of “protective security” insofar as it promoted full employment and a rela-
tively wide distribution of economic gains. In better times, this model
appeared to unite the best of two worlds: the dynamism of American capi-
talism with the social security of European social democracy. However, the
fact remains that Asian developmentalism jettisoned a wide range of non-
material goals, most notably those of environmental health and sustainabili-
ty. In short, the “miracle” did not come cheaply.
It would be unfair, of course, to pin the onus of raw economism on this
region without noting the equally catastrophic environmental irresponsibili-
ty of Western and Soviet developmentalism in their takeoff phases. What set
Asian planners apart was the opportunity they had to reap the advantage of
late-comer development: the chance to learn from a vast array of Western
mistakes. Ideas on this subject were percolating as early as the 1950s (Sen,
1999: 290),1 and were very much “in the air” by the 1970s — the seeds of
postmaterialism having been spread by the counterculture of the 1960s. But
even in the absence of these second thoughts from the West, nonmaterial
social concerns were anything but new to Asian thought. Only a distinctly
Westernized version of “Asian values” could categorically ignore such con-
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cerns.
Unfortunately, the ideology behind these ersatz Asian values was closed
to critical examination once the engine of double-digit growth was churn-
ing. The region’s new affluence ensured the legitimacy of those regimes that
happened to ride this developmental wave, as if there was no choice. It took
the Asian Crash to break that spurious determinism, putting a question
mark on the working assumptions of three decades of full-throttle, no-ques-
tions-asked economism. All of Asia would feel the political aftershocks of
the Crash, as the cardinal tenets of Asian developmentalism came under
investigation. However, in Korea and Taiwan, where a democratic transfor-
mation was already in progress by the late 1980s, the postmaterial question
would carry less political weight than in Southeast Asia, where radical pas-
sions led to the overthrow of Suharto in Indonesia and threatened all
authoritarian regimes.
TOWARD AN ASIAN POSTMATERIALISM
Perhaps the best prototype for pan-Asian revisionism is Amartya Sen’s
Development as Freedom (1999: 15), which reverses the standard priorities of
economic and political development and especially challenges Lee Kuan
Yew’s insistence that harsh political systems are necessary for Asian growth.
Before the Crash, democratic values were often dismissed — along with
human rights, gender rights, and environmental protection — as luxuries to
be deferred until after development was complete. Many reversed that logic
after the Crash. Now it was authoritarianism, and the crony capitalism
which it spawns, that came to be seen as the main obstacles to development.
At first that criticism was used to drive a wedge between Western and
Eastern capitalism, but after Enron and a multitude of similar revelations
concerning crony capitalism in the West, that myth was shattered (Mydans,
2003). This opened the door for a more general postmaterial critique, equal-
ly applicable to the East and West.
Unfortunately, Sen has tended to ignore the ecological side of that cri-
tique, which is a prime concern of postmaterial development (Kapur, 1999).2
What is needed is a merger of Sen’s democratism with the kind of environ-
mental consciousness that has been propounded by a host of Indian writers
such as Vandana Shiva and Arundhati Roy. Bello (2001: 91-5) likewise
grounds his development model on sustainability. This synthesis might
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have seemed utopian in years past, but after the Crash it carries much politi-
cal weight.
While opening the door for a postmaterial turn to (or rather return to)
Asian values, the Crash also invites the retrieval of earlier Asian develop-
ment. It is often forgotten that the “Asian model” of the 1960s and early
1970s gave priority to both economic growth and equity (Donnelly, 1989:
307). This model accords with the thrust of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) meeting of 1972, which endorsed balanced growth and the
reduction of inequality as prime developmental concerns. This egalitarian
factor was subverted by the raw economism of so-called “miracle” growth.
For an institutional insider such as Stiglitz (2002: 241) to endorse this tradi-
tional Asian concern was still considered radical at the end of the twentieth
century, thanks in part to the ethical hiatus that the “Asian values” model
enforced.
Like that “miracle,” the Crash had far reaching political and economic
consequences. It not only challenged the hard hit governments on the Rim,
but also the global system as a whole. While stimulating fresh debate over
the Asian development model, it resurrected older issues, such as “depen-
dency theory.” Before the Asian takeoff, many Latin American and African
countries had been on par with their Asian counterparts. South Korea and
Ghana, for example, were at roughly the same level of development in the
early 1960s (Huntington, 2000: xiii). But three decades later, the “Asian mir-
acle” had left most developing economies behind. It did so, moreover, in the
name of an authoritarian ethos that would have been considered reac-
tionary even by the standards of early twentieth century corporatism. 
While the double-digit growth of Pacific Rim economies discredited
“dependency” theory, it revived faith in capitalist development worldwide.
Thus, power elites in the West were pleased to strike a globalist bargain
with “Asian values” by legitimating growth at all costs (Thornton, 2002: 12).
In Indonesia, for example, those costs were distinctly illiberal. Western-edu-
cated technocrats allied themselves with the Army to anchor Suharto’s New
Order militarily. This techno-military regime, strongly anti-communist and
pro-development (Anwar, 1994: 279), undertook to de-politicize Indonesia
in the manner of Singapore’s even more sweeping anti-politics. In the late
1950s and early 1960s, Singaporean politics had been remarkably open and
democratic (Khong, 1995: 109). By smothering this tradition, Lee Kuan
Yew’s technocrats went too far, even for their own good. The result has been
such a dearth of interest in politics among Singaporean youth that it is hard
to recruit fresh talent for the People’s Action Party (PAP). Prime Minister
Goh Chok Tong has been forced to raise salaries to attract even marginally
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qualified political functionaries (Saywell, 2000). 
Singapore nonetheless passes for the jewel in the crown of Asian global-
ization. This is possible because, as Jan Aart Scholte (2001: 14) observes, cur-
rent globalization has sidestepped democracy in favor of the “free market”
as “the be-all and end-all politics.” The antithesis of PAP’s priorities is locat-
ed in Sen’s equally “Asian” freedom-as-development model. Sen and other
developmental revisionists think it is time to balance free market
economism with an unyielding concern for “local cultures, ecology, and
social issues such as health and education (Kapur, 1999).” For Sen (1999: 37),
political liberties have an “instrumental” as well as “intrinsic” value.
CRISIS OF SUSTAINABILITY
Sen’s position can fairly be called “postmodern,” insofar as modernist
development theory has been grounded on raw economism. This postmod-
ern turn, which Nussbaum (2000) takes even farther than Sen, is well exem-
plified by the UN’s Human Development Report, which accesses nations “not
just by their GNP, but also their achievements in areas such as health, edu-
cation, gender equality, and political liberty” (Kapur, 1999). Judged by this
standard, globalization must be assessed by social and environmental crite-
ria, and not just by economic growth. Especially, it cannot be measured sim-
ply by short-term growth, where environmental degradation and social dis-
ruption hardly register. 
While a sustainable model of development is not averse to growth, it sets
limits based on social and environmental impact (Luke, 1999: 136-7).3 The
resulting paradigm shift is better termed “postmaterial” than postmodern,
for postmodernism has been closely associated with a “hermeneutics of sus-
picion,” whose net effect is social and political inertia. Postmaterialism, by
contrast, does more than interrogate existing global power structures. It
offers a viable alternative, such as the program broached in the Rio
Declaration at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), where emphasis was given to intergenerational equity (Sands,
1995: 58). It was here that sustainable development took the fore as the high
road to progress. Sadly, the next decade saw little such progress. A pall of
failed aspirations hung over the World Summit on Sustainable
Development at Johannesburg in August 2002.
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Worse still, the basic premise of sustainable development — the co-exis-
tence of economic and ecological progress — was coming unhinged at
Johannesburg, as the ‘South’ departed from the Rio script on socio-ecologi-
cal complimentarity. Led by South Africa, the ‘South’ wanted to turn the
conference into an ordinary “development” summit, putting the environ-
ment on a back burner (Sachs, 2002). This is not to say that the South’s per-
spective should simply be shelved. Most people in the South see the key
problem as their lack of control over their own natural resources (Doyle and
McEachern, 1998: 75). That vantage complements sustainability insofar as
absentee ownership encourages unlimited environmental exploitation.
It must be recognized, however, that local and equitable ownership can
also be exploitative where short-term economism is the rule. “Short-ter-
mism” (to coin a phrase) is the force behind slash-and-burn agriculture,
which is no less destructive than massive agro-corporatism. Short-termism
of either form is a blueprint for disaster, for both trash the environment that
people must inhabit. Profits, along with the classes that reap them, are high-
ly mobile, but most people are not. The general population is left behind to
suffer the ecological consequences.
Postmaterialism represents, first and foremost, a departure from the uni-
dimensional focus on economic growth that has characterized globalization
in general and East Asian development in particular. By no means has this
failed paradigm lost its appeal with power elites after the Crash. Korea and
Japan are typical in their fixation with top-down “reform.” Postmaterialism,
by contrast, is a bottom-up phenomenon insofar as it is born out of political
resistance. This resistance does not always issue from the left, or even from
the “life politics” that for Callinicos (2001: 118) can only mean anti-capitalist
politics. Rather, it issues from the broad oppositionalism that was vented in
the anti-WTO demonstrations of November 1999, in Seattle.
Postmaterial values not only move beyond the conventional Left and
Right, but also beyond the “problem-solving” orientation that characterizes
the “Third Way,” as fashioned by Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair. This
revaluation is not content simply to reform neoliberalism (Elliott, 1998: 245).
It takes aim at the root malady which early environmentalism failed to con-
front: the culturally-embedded waste of global capitalism (Benton and
Redclift, 1994: 14, 25). Only a full “life-style” critique, whereby human and
natural relations are sustainably interwoven (Benton and Redclift, 1994: 16),
can work at the root level. This critique counters the technologism that is as
central to global finance as it is to the social sciences (on the former see
Elliott, 1998: 246; on the latter see Benton and Redclift, 1994: 2).
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THE ASIAN APPROPRIATION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGISM
It is here that the question of “Asian values” enters the debate, for Asian
societies once lived in relative harmony with nature. Lynn White, Jr. argues
that our global environmental crisis is mainly the product of the Judeo-
Christian religious tradition, which puts god above nature, and casts man in
god’s image. This justifies unlimited abuse of nature in the name of devel-
opment (Dryzek, 1997: 161; Zimmerman, 1994: 45). The Asian appropriation
of Western technologism reshaped cultural norms in that image, affecting
ordinary life as surely as it did production techniques. 
This did not so much de-Asianize the East as reconfigure the power rela-
tions of Asian society. Commercial values were not new to the East, but had
been strictly subordinate to non-material orientations such as Confucianism,
Taoism and Buddhism. Pye (2000: 248-9) reminds us that throughout the
Confucian cultural sphere, the merchant stood “near the bottom of the
social scale, below even the peasant.” Social elites, such as Korean yangban
aristocrats, disdained commercial and industrial activity (Macdonald, 1996:
195). The rapid influx of Western techno-capitalism did not extirpate these
traditional values, but simply inverted their status relative to commercial
values. These inverted priorities appropriated the name of “Asian values”
during the “miracle” years of double-digit growth. Thus non-material val-
ues lost their social standing while material, accumulative values gripped
government policy as never before.
Asian postmaterialism can embrace what E. F. Schumacher terms
“Buddhist economics,” whereby individuals seek to “maximize well-being
at a minimum level of consumption” (Dryzek, 1997: 161); or it can draw
upon Gandhian philosophy, as proposed by the Swedish Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation (Carmen, 1996: 30-1). Either way, it amounts to
the restoration of a deeper and broader range of Asian values to the sphere
of social and political decision-making. That is its conservative side. Its pro-
gressive side lies in its openness to political reform whereby traditional
authoritarianism is supplanted by postmaterial goals such as democracy,
social equity, and ecological sustainability.
GRASSROOTS ALTERNATIVES AND NGO TRANSLOCALISM
To adopt these goals is to recognize the fallacy of “TINA”: the notion that
“there is no alternative” to globalization in its current form. Even the so-
called Third Way, which purports to be reformist, accepts the basic postu-
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lates of TINA. As formulated by Giddens (1998), the Third Way does little to
combat the root injustice of globalization that Bello (2001) and Stiglitz (2002)
document. Given that deterministic premise, meager reforms look appeal-
ing. At least they are an improvement over such dismal alternatives as eth-
nic cleansing, militant neonationalism, and global terrorism. Far from pos-
ing a real threat to globalization, these horrors actually serve as a foil for its
legitimacy, just as unreformed globalization serves as a foil for the so-called
Third Way. The Third Way passes itself off as the best moral counterforce
available within the globalist paradigm. That may well be true; but the point is
that there are alternative paradigms. 
Even after the Asian financial crisis, Callinicos (2001: 105) notes that the
Third Way saw no need for a serious reexamination of globalization. As
Anderson states, the Third Way is but an ideological shell for neoliberalism
(Callinicos, 2001: 109). Any genuine corrective for the “First Way” excesses
must come to terms with the failure not only of post-crisis IMFism, but also
the glaring defects of pre-crisis developmentalism. In short, it must confront
the structural inadequacies of global capitalism. This means raising the
Third Way critique to a postmaterial plane.
This postmaterial turn need not be anti-developmental. Drawing upon
data from 43 developing countries, Inglehart (1997) posits a postmaterial
development model based upon value changes that stem from economic
growth. These include a declining emphasis on economism as well as
declining respect for political and techno-scientific authority (Inglehart,
1997: 39). Sen goes farther, in that his concept of “poverty as capability
deprivation” does not rest on prior economic development. Rather, it argues
for concurrent material and postmaterial means and ends. His prime exam-
ple is the Indian state of Kerala, whose economic underdevelopment – as
compared with richer states such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and
Madhya Pradesh – is offset by its more egalitarian distribution of education,
health care and land reform (Sen, 1999: 91).
The egalitarian approach to development, however, entails a grassroots
plane of action that makes broad cooperation difficult. Some form of com-
munication and mediation is necessary. Fortunately, one translocal source is
already at hand in NGOs, which have the advantage of being non-statist as
well as non-corporate. Hertz (2001) holds that the surrender of government
power to giant corporations is the deadliest threat facing democracy today.
However, the reverse case is no better: the domination of corporations by
government. Neither is conducive to democracy. The corporate-government
partnership (regardless of which partner holds sway) represents a top-down
structure of domination vis-à-vis “people power.”
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Inglehart’s mode of postmaterialism does not escape this subversion. His
suggestion that affluence alone will rectify this democratic defect is still
trapped in the basic assumptions of modernist and neoliberal development
models. The Asian Pacific experience proves that wealth is just as likely to
buttress reactionary regimes as to contain them, much less uproot them. A
more direct route to democratic development must be found. It is no acci-
dent, therefore, that current Korean activism on behalf of civil society, envi-
ronmentalism, and other postmaterial causes is almost entirely grassroots in
nature.
This has been its strength, in that it could not be easily co-opted; but it has
also been its weakness, in that coordinated opposition was hard to sustain.
NGOs can be part of the eco-political solution (Doyle and McEachern, 1998:
85-6),4 since they are relatively free from traditional political and social con-
straints, but they can also create a new obstacle in that they are simply too
diverse in size and orientation (Elliott, 1998: 135). Much as global environ-
mental organizations are forging coalitions such as the IUCN (International
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) (Hajer, 1995:
277), Korean NGOs are working to overcome this shortcoming through
umbrella coalitions or website affiliations such as the DNSM (Democracy
and Social Movements).5 Likewise the Japan Tropical Forest Action
Network (JATAN) now links not only Japanese NGOs, but also a global net-
work of environmentally active organizations (Princen and Finger, 1994: 3). 
As the JATAN example suggests, INGOs (international NGOs) can be a
vital link between local, regional and global concerns. Conservation must
have a local focus (Selman, 1996: 3-4), but the region provides an increasing-
ly important context for environmental issues. Nothing illustrates this better
than the 1994 and 1997 forest fires in Indonesia, which challenged the
“ASEAN way” of principled non-interference. The haze had originated
from deliberate agro-industrial arson. Soon it blanketed not only Indonesia
but Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, parts of Thailand and the southern
Philippines, impacting the entire regional economy as well as public health
and the environment. While tourist revenues plummeted, some seventy mil-
lion people sought treatment for respiratory problems, asthma, and eye and
skin irratations (McNally, 1998). When a 1995 “Co-operation Plan on Trans-
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Boundary Pollution” failed to prevent the next haze, another “Regional
Haze Action Plan” was ratified in 1997 (Ramcharan, 2000: 68-9). Clearly,
there must be local, regional, and global cooperation (Swanson and
Johnston, 1999: 204), and interventionist strategies must be considered when
voluntary cooperation fails.
This transformation at the “macro” level, however, is matched by a
“micro” revolution in developmental thinking. Escobar challenges existing
developmental discourse by foregrounding new social movements (NSM)
as the nuclei of an alternative discourse “to (rather than of) development”
(Crush, 1995: 20). NSM discourses are postmodern in their “polyvalent,
local, dispersed and fragmented” characteristics (Crush, 1995: 20). This
imparts a grassroots and “Southern” element onto an otherwise “Northern”
discourse on sustainable development (Adams, 1995: 88).
CONCLUSION: A NEW ASIAN MODEL
Ultimately the tension is not between “Southern” and “Northern”
approaches, but radical and technocentrist ones. The latter lays stress on the
“rational” use of the environment (Adams, 1995: 89-90), which can easily
serve the interest of existing power structures; whereas environmental radi-
calism is rooted in eco-socialist values (Adams, 1995: 93). Radicals hold that
poverty and injustice will endure so long as an orthodox urban-industrial
vision of human purpose prevails (Adams, 1995: 94). This radical/techno-
cratic dichotomy is at the heart of Ferry’s (1995: xxiv) distinction between a
“deep ecology,” which is bio-centric or eco-centric, and a “shallow ecology”
which is basically anthropocentrist.
Although the greatest barrier to deep ecology is culture, this can also be a
source of strength. Stone (1993: 240) seeks a cultural corrective in the holistic
and environmentally balanced values of Buddhism, and many Islamic
scholars have recently called attention to a similar ecological sensitivity in
the Koran.6 Too often the West equates progress with “supermarket packag-
ing, big cars, pesticide harvests, take-out meals with their throw-away
plates, hair sprays, and mountains of nonbiodegradable trash (Stone, 1993:
241).” It is a grotesque irony that this trashing of both culture and the envi-
ronment is now adopted by Asian elites as the core objective of moderniza-
tion, which they take to be consistent with “Asian values.” The green alter-
34 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
6 In May of 1998 the Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions hosted a
conference on “Islam and Ecology.” For an overview of these proceedings and numerous use-
ful abstracts, see www.hds.harvard.edu/cswr/ecology/islam.htm.
native draws upon an alliance between traditionalists, postmaterialists, and
marginalized citizens (Adams, 1995: 94-5). So too this paradigm mandates a
global/local and North/South alliance for social and environmental securi-
ty (Renner, 1997: 136-8).
The World Social Summit of 1995 recognized that “poverty, unemploy-
ment and social disintegration are closely linked to issues of peace and secu-
rity” (Renner, 1997: 142). We may add that all of these are ultimately tied to
environmental sustainability. There has long been a need for closer working
relations between environmental and economic concerns (Lee and
Kirkpatrick, 2000: 1); but there has been no smoking gun of modernist bank-
ruptcy to counter the so-called “Asian miracle.” The Asian Crash provided
that crucial opportunity to retire modernist and neoliberal development
models in favor of a more holistic approach. 
By no accident, this postmaterial turn leads us to a more inclusive view of
Asian values as well. This is consistent with Anwar Ibrahim’s vision of an
Asian Renaissance that sheds the prejudices of East and West alike.7 Going
beyond the raw economism of so-called “Asian values,” Anwar looks to the
diversity of Asian culture as “a powerful counter movement to the tendency
toward homogenization, the kind of cultural reductionism that goes along
with globalization” (quoted in Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 145). The new Asian
model, as the developmental wing of the Asian Renaissance, springs from
that same process of resistance. If there is a postmaterial alternative to glob-
alist ideology, this will be one of its major sources. Its very existence puts
“globalization on trial” by testifying that another development paradigm is
possible.
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